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A major goal of health planners has been to prevent unnecessary duplication of health facilities. In 1978, the Health Resources Administration (HRA) of the Department of Health and Human Services established guidelines for regulators to use in avoiding such duplication. To date, however, there has been no systematic analysis of the savings that would accrue if the guidelines were fully implemented.
In this study, William Schwartz, professor of medicine at Tufts, and Paul Joskow, profes sor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, evaluate the potential cost savings from the consolidation of the four kinds of facilities most often viewed as costly and redundant: computerized axial-tomographic (CAT) head and body scanners, open heart surgery and cardiac catheterization facilities, megavoltage radiation therapy units, and general hospital beds. They conclude that "the expected saving falls far short of HHS goals," and that the costs of consolidation-in regulatory expense and inconvenience to patients-"would reduce or possibly eradicate this gain."
The authors first determine the number, intensity of use, and annual operating costs of the facilities in each category. Taking total patient demand as fixed, they then compare the actual rates of usage with the HRA guidelines and calculate the number of facilities required to serve prevailing patient demands at the utilization rates defined by the guidelines. The difference between the actual number of facilities and the "required" number indicates the extent of duplication. Finally, they multiply the number of patients served in duplicative facilities by the average current cost per patient, and subtract the marginal cost of treating these patients in remaining facilities. The result is the net savings from consolidation.
For CAT the shortage, but by extending them to the intrastate market. The incremental pricing provisions of the act also require pipelines to recover their higher acquisition cost of natural gas first from large industrial customers, up to the price of alternative fuel, and only then from residential and commercial customers.
The unregulated market is an ideal allocator of natural gas, the author writes, supplying gas to those end-users who value it most highly. But while protracted phase-in periods and interim extensions of regulatory jurisdiction may be a political requisite of decontrol legislation, the "curtailment" provisions of the act are both economically unwise and politically unnecessary. Here, Merrill says, a "secondbest" policy would have achieved a more efficient allocation of natural gas without harming residential and commercial customers. When utilities curtail supplies under the act, they must allocate gas according to purchases made in 1972, without regard to changing demand conditions or regional variations in the permissibility of burning high-sulfur fuels. At least among industrial customers, a price system could replace arbitrary curtailments. The "Vickrey" auction, a sealed-bid auction used for new equity issues on the French stock exchange and certain Treasury bill sales here, is one such simple and efficient procedure. Merrill estimates that $1 billion was lost to the U.S. economy in 1977-78 because of inefficient curtailment practices. Half of this loss, he concludes, could have been eliminated by competitive auctions.
Stalking the "Unfair" Price Cut Can a firm that is dominant in an industry cut its prices enough to drive its competitors out of the field, and then raise prices to monopoly levels? This question has long engaged the attention of economists and antitrust theorists. In this article, John S. McGee of the University of Washington critically reviews the recent literature on "strategic" or "predatory" pricing. His own view is that because "predatory price cutting imposes greater costs upon predator than prey," it is unlikely to pose much of a threat to competitive balance.
A "strategic" price cut is one that would not have been undertaken except as an investment in greater future monopoly. But since price cutting is normal competitive behavior in a great many situations, especially where one firm is more efficient than another, strategic price cuts are frequently hard to distinguish from "nonstrategic" or ordinary cuts.
A dominant firm will succeed in its predatory campaign only if the competitor it is attacking permanently retires its assets from production-converting them irrevocably to other uses, selling them to the predator, or simply not replacing them as they wear out. A predatory strategy of "grinding down" a victim's plant, so that it wears out faster than it is recourts in weighing allegations of predatory pricing. Some legal rules would require price reductions to be "quasi-permanent," restrict promotional pricing, or forbid dominant firms from increasing output in the face of new competition. Too many of these proposals, he says, would encourage charges of predation by less efficient firms that have (quite properly) been forced to the wall as a result of ordinary competitive price-cutting. placed, may pose more risks for the would-be monopolist than for the victim. Since the predator is likely to increase its market share and thus its share of production, McGee notes, it will be grinding dawn its own plant faster than its competitor's. (If the predator is pricing below its variable costs, it will also be losing more money than its victim both absolutely and proportionately.) And "because it will take a long time to grind down long-lived and specialized capital assets," McGee says, "these kinds of assets hold the predator hostage at least as effectively as they do the prey."
Moreover, a victim's decision to withdraw its assets permanently from the field depends not on the current but on the expected future profitability of the assets. Even if the victim is now losing money, the prospect of earning high profits when the price war is over will encourage it to replace its assets as they wear out and to demand a high (rather than distress) price if the predator offers to purchase. The predator could, to be sure, wipe out the victim's expectation of future profits if it could effectively threaten to hold prices down indefinitely. McGee contends, however, that such a threat is unlikely to be believed, since it would be suicidal to carry it out unless the predator were genuinely more efficient than the prey. Some theorists have speculated that a predator with a "long purse" could outlast a victim in a price war. McGee counters that no one has ever shown why predators could acquire the reserves they need, but victims could not. At- tempts at predation may also be foiled if customers can store commodities during periods of low prices or enter into contracts with the predator's intended victim. Nor will actual or threatened predation be any more successful, he says, as a way of discouraging prospective or potential competitors. McGee Federal affirmative action efforts typically follow a two-stage pattern. In the first stage, the government tries to prove past discrimination by comparing the racial or sexual composition of an employer's work force with that of some relevant pool of job applicants or the labor force in general. If the government claims to find such past discrimination, it proceeds to the second stage: negotiating an affirmative action plan by which the employer agrees to adopt numerical hiring and promotion goals for members of the protected groups.
In this book Richard Lester, formerly dean of faculty at Princeton and vice-chairman of the President's Commission on the Status of Women, critically examines the federal contract compliance program, the Equal Pay Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as they have been applied to professional, academic, executive, and civil service employment during the past decade. He argues that the methods used both for assessing discrimination and for remedying it where found are ill-suited to many types of professional and managerial work and tend to undermine the integrity of promotion and pay systems based on individual merit. The primary reason for this, he says, is that the performance of "highly individualistic" scholarly or managerial work cannot be easily standardized and quantified for purposes of comparison across broad categories. Most analyses of discrimination fail because they must ignore individual performance and concentrate instead on a few easily measured aggregates.
In When the government came up with guidelines for the analysis of university salaries, it provided that "only the salaries of women and minorities were to be tested for salary equity, and only those below the calculated norm were to be considered for corrective, special salary increases." Correction, Lester notes, "is not for all inequity but only for persons in the designated categories and in one direction." Labor Department lawyers, Lester adds, have sought to prove invidious pay disparities by pairing "a single female and a single male faculty member across disciplinary lines in the arts and sciences (for example, a professor in English and one in chemistry)," because both are in the same occupational category in the same "establishment." They do this even though the college may be competing with lucrative outside pay offers in the latter but not the former case. [T] he curriculum activities -because they were uncontroversial in the early years and seemed so reasonable-helped to create a climate in which government intrusiveness seemed natural."
It was in the 1970s that special-interest groups began working their will systematically on local education, Atkin says, with help from both legislatures and courts. Schools were increasingly under obligation to provide for bilingual education, ethnic history, vocational education, and drug abuse counseling, among many other programs. The passage of such landmark legislation as the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, which required educators to come up with an individual learning plan for each child, was testimony to the political clout of the interest groups.
The first major reaction to federal involvement arose in the mid-seventies, with the controversy that surrounded "Man-A Course of Study" (MACOS), a curriculum project supported by the National Science Foundation. While parent activists could block some individual projects of this sort, they soon discovered that local schools had come to rely on federal financial help. "The 8 or 9 percent of the local education budget provided by the federal government," notes Atkin, "turned out to be not marginal but essential."
State governments too were extending unprecedented controls over local educational autonomy during the seventies. Here the reasons were different: a desire to cut costs during a period of falling enrollments and a pervasive concern about the decline in educational quality indicated by the continuing drop in test scores. State governments also were susceptible to special-interest lobbying. One ballot initiative now pending in California would require 200 minutes per week of instruction in the arts. Some interventions crop up in different forms at the state and federal levels. One is the continuing policy of "mainstreaming" children who once were placed in special classes or institutions, such as the handicapped or delinquent, who are the subject of federal and state guidelines respectively. Because such children command disproportionate attention from the teacher, they can disrupt regular educational activities.
Caught between state and federal, legislative and judicial, presences in the classroom, teachers are increasingly finding that their "range for professional action is being narrowed, with individuals farther and farther from the classroom making basic decisions about curriculum," Atkin says. And while the government intrusions may have helped some of the most disadvantaged students, Atkin believes, the overall effect has been more a leveling down of achievement. He predicts that parents with the means to do so may provide their children with private educations in coming years, adding: "We may be entering a period in which government services reduced to the bone will increasingly serve only the handicapped, the juvenile offender, and the poor. In this article, Vander Weide and Zalkind examine the economic consequences of deregulation using a model of regulated oligopolistic rivalry. The oligopolistic firm in their model produces a product having both quantity and quality dimensions. Although the firm's revenue is explicitly based only on the quantity it sells, the demand for its product depends on the product's price and quality, as well as those of its competitors.
Vander Weide and Zalkind study two possible types of cost function, representing contrasting ways in which quality can affect the costs of production. One applies to those dimensions of quality, such as automobile safety, whose cost varies directly with sales volume. The other applies to quality dimensions, such as numbers of bank branches or airline flights, whose cost is independent of sales volume (adding a new flight may cost about the same amount whether it attracts one or fifty new customers). Both of the authors' cost functions allow for the presence of economies or diseconomies of scale.
For each cost function, Vander Weide and Zalkind examine the economic effects of deregulation in two kinds of industries-those where price and entry are regulated and firms compete on the basis of product quality, such as airlines and trucking, and those where quality and entry are regulated but firms compete on the basis of price, such as banking in states that limit branching. Their results suggest that the economic consequences of deregulation depend on a variety of factors, including which variables had previously been regulated and which are to be deregulated, whether the regulated variables had been fixed at levels higher or lower than those which would obtain in an unregulated oligopoly, and the nature of individual firm cost and demand functions. If entry into airline markets is deregulated but price remains fixed, for instance, then the number of flights per carrier, the number of passengers per carrier, and the load factor will decrease, but total flights serving the market and total passengers in the market will increase. If both price and entry are deregulated, however, the increase in flights in a market resulting from entry deregulation may be more than offset by a decrease in flights resulting from price deregulation. This effect could occur where the pre-existing regulated price level was below that which the unregulated oligopoly produces. Often waste recovery is institutionalized by operating the waste-producing and wasteconsuming processes at the same site. This "systems approach" is particularly suited to thermal effluents, which are used for everything from local space heating to the cultivation of eels ($6 million worth at one Scottish distillery) . Royston lists twenty-five examples of such integrated systems.
Royston cites Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M), the diversified American company, to demonstrate how one firm can profit by "viewing pollution as an indicator of waste and an opportunity for profit rather than as a costly threat." In a four-year span in which 3M's production increased significantly, the company cut its liquid effluents from 47 tons to 2.6 tons, gaseous effluents from 3,000 tons to 2,400 tons, and solid waste from 6,000 tons to 1,800 tons. The result: a saving of $2.4 million a year. Perhaps most significant is that 3M achieved its gains not by installing new pollution control equipment but by rethinking the production process itself: "reformulating products, redesigning equipment, modifying processes, or recovering materials for reuse." Royston sums up this approach as "good housekeeping." "The key to 3M's success," he adds, "has been giving corporate-wide recognition to the importance of technological innovation in making the company efficient and profitable, delegating responsibility and initiative to the shop floor, and rewarding all company personnel who get involved" in the program.
But even 3M would be hard put to match DSM, the Dutch state coal and chemical enterprise. DSM stages internal simulations of public environmental-impact hearings, with company employees playing the roles of ecology activists. Such precautions can help avert court challenges to planned projects, Royston says, adding: "The ultimate objective of the corporation is survival, and reaching that depends very much on the adaptation of the corporation to its environment."
Making Cable TV Pay? (Continued from page 39) approach would eliminate the cumbersome and impractical CRT process, leaving the pricing of copyrighted programs to the marketplace.
Admittedly, this solution is imperfect. However, in light of the entrenched position of the traditional cable system and the claims of their viewers, some compromise with free market principles is probably unavoidable. The compromise outlined here is the fairest possible, for both cable and for the copyright owners. The latter would have full copyright protection in those markets (the 100 largest) from which they draw 90 percent of their revenues. And the great majority of the 4,200-odd cable systems would be better off because, as systems in the smaller markets, they would have no copyright payments. The larger cable systems in the top 100 markets can well afford to pay for the programming they use and, in any event, will depend for their success on pay-TV and the new services. For them to seek to retain the relatively small advantage of a compulsory copyright for distant signal carriage is piggishness-an assault on the rules of fair play.
IT IS DIFFICULT to sympathize with the broadcast industry. Indeed, there is something almost deliciously ironic in the problems it now confronts because of cable. For it was VHF broadcaster pressures that led to the present inadequate spectrum allocations system that, in turn, fostered the growth of cable (see Stanley M. Besen and Thomas G. Krattenmaker, page 27). And it was the broadcasters that held back the development of over-the-air pay-TV for decades, so that when enterprising cable systems turned to satellite-distributed pay-TV as a device for penetrating the major markets, the move was not precluded by a long-established subscription TV service. Like Rubashov in Darkness at Noon, they are being devoured by a force of their own making (although it should be noted that about one-third of the cable systems are owned by VHF broadcasters).
The copyright owners, however, have done nothing to deserve the inequities of compulsory license. Enough violence has been done to the marketplace in the last two decades. It is time-indeed, long past time-to bring true deregulation to the cable copyright field.
